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A DIGITAL ALBATROSS 1 : NAVIGATING THE
LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF DOMESTIC POLICE
DRONE TECHNOLOGY VERSUS PRIVACY
RIGHTS IN MASSACHUSETTS AND BEYOND
"Once you have tastedflight, you will forever walk the earth with
your eyes turned skyward, for there you have been and there you will
always long to return.,2
I. INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the Boston Marathon bombing the partnership
between emerging technologies and law enforcement operations vaulted
into the public discourse.' While families anxiously called loved ones in
the Boston area, the FBI and other law enforcement officials urgently
combed through digital surveillance video searching for answers.4 Days
later and upon a tentative identification of possible suspects, police moved
into Watertown, engaging in a dramatic shootout as some college students
live-tweeted information from their television and internet police scanners.'
1 See Samuel Taylor Coleridge, The Rime of the Ancient Mariner, in Lyrical Ballads, with a
Few Other Poems (1798), available at http://www.poetryfoundation.org/poem/173253
(establishing albatross birds as paradoxical symbol of both good fortune and curse); see also Peter
Finn, Rise of the drone: From Calif garage to multibillion-dollardefense industry, WASH. POST
(Dec. 23, 2011), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/rise-ofthe-drone-from-calif-garage-to-multibillion-dollar-defenseindustry/2011/12/22/gIQACG8UEPstory.html.
Abraham Karem, inventor of the infamous
Predator Drone, tested early-unmanned vehicles with the first prototype nicknamed "Albatross."
Finn, supra. Mr. Karem and his colleagues also engineered a viable model of one of Da Vinci's
renaissance-era flying machine designs. Id.
2 LEONARDO

DA

VINCI, CODEX ATLANTICUS

(circa 1490).

Leonardo DaVinci made

revolutionary attempts at developing workable aircraft systems during the Renaissance era. See
id. One of Da Vinci's early aircraft blueprints included the reference, "[n]on il volo umano,"
meaning "[n]on-human flight." See Jayson Clifford and Massood Towhidnejad, Blackbird
Unmanned Aircraft System, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF AERONAUTICS AND ASTRONAUTICS (Apr.
2009), available at http://enu.kz/repository/2009/AIAA-2009-1900.pdf; cf PREDATOR UAS,
GENERAL ATOMICS
AERONAUTICAL,
http://www.ga-asi.com/products/aircraft/predator.php
(summarizing modem predator drone capabilities).
3 Marathon
Bombing
Timeline,
BOS.
GLOBE
(Apr.
28,
2013),
http://www.bostonglobe.com/2013/04/27/marathon-bombingtimeline/9RL3oUZRmJZ4mJRFB5hkxK/story.htil (detailing timeline of events during and after
Boston Marathon bombing incident).
4 See id.
' See id.
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With one suspect killed and another at-large, members of the
Massachusetts State Police Bomb Squad cautiously commanded a robotic
vehicle or "unmanned ground vehicle" (UGV) to detect and diffuse the
improvised explosive devices left at the scene. 6 By nightfall the following
day, and after a so-called "Shelter-in-Place" order by Massachusetts
Governor Deval Patrick, the manhunt came to an end with police operating
a robotic arm to reveal the interior of the suspect's boat hideout.7
Subsequently, a Massachusetts State Police helicopter provided aerial
reconnaissance to the tactical law enforcement teams on the ground
equipped with forward looking infrared (FLIR) technology.8
Although the prospect of domestic "unmanned aerial vehicles"
(UAV) or "drones" being utilized by law enforcement has invoked wide
anxiety in the legal community concerning the balance between privacy
and security, 9 police have long utilized emerging technologies in aerial
search and rescue missions, unmanned tactical bomb squad robots, hostage

6

See id.; see also Steve Annear, Waltham-BasedRobotics Company Lends Arm'During

Bomb Searches,BOS. MAGAZINE (Apr. 24, 2013), available at
http://www.bostonmagazine.com/news/blog/2013/04/24/qinetiq-waltham-robots-talon-marathon/
(noting role of robotics in high risk police responses).
7 See Ryan Villarreal, Robots Helped Capture Boston Bombing Suspect, 1B TIMES (Apr. 21,
2013, 1:32 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/robots-helped-capture-boston-bombing-suspect-video1206075 (illustrating role of robots in Boston Marathon bombing manhunt).
8 See George Graham, State Police Air Wing Crew that Spotted Boston Bombing Suspect
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Inside Watertown Boat Discusses Capture, THE REPUBLICAN (Apr. 26, 2013,

3:29
PM),
http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2013/04/massachusettsstatepolice air crewspotted
boston bombingsuspect discusses capture.html (outlining Massachusetts State Police's
helicopter operations during Boston marathon bombing manhunt); see also David Abel, Boat
Owner Seeks to Clarify Record on Tsarnaev capture, BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 16, 2013), available at
http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/10/1 5/six-months-later-man-who-found-dzhokhartsamaev-his-boat-tries-move/fMSWzruQfE2EUNYXjXKOZP/storyhtml;
Sara
Germano,
Security for Marathons Could Include Drones, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Apr. 26, 2013),
available

at

http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 10001424127887324474004578445244172239854
(highlighting former Boston Police Commissioner's comments on possible use of drones for
future Boston Marathons); Hunter Walker, Police Release Photos Showing How Thermal
Imaging And Robotics Uncovered Bombing Suspect, TALKING POINTS MEMO (Apr. 20, 2013,

4:10 PM), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/livewire/police-release-photos-showing-how-thermalimaging-and-robotics-uncovered-bombing-suspect.
9 See Joan Lowry, AP-NCC Poll: A third of the public fears police use of drones for
surveillance will erode their privacy, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sep. 27, 2013), available at

http://ap-gfkpoll.com/uncategorized/our-latest-poll-findings-13

(polling data showing 1/3 of

Americans fear domestic law enforcement drones). But see National: US. Supports Unarmed
Domestic Drones, MONMOUTH UNIVERSITY POLL (Aug. 15, 2013), available at

https://www.monnouth.edu/assets/0/322 12254770/32212254991/32212254992/32212254994/32
212254995/30064771087/409aecfb-3897-4360-8a05-03838ba69e46.pdf (showing majority of
Americans favoring law enforcement drones if warrant is obtained).
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crisis and electronic wiretapping of organized crime. 10 Nevertheless, the
potential of drones coming to the domestic front raises fair and legitimate
privacy concems. 11 Even the so-called "militarization" of local law
enforcement has become a controversial trend in policing, with domestic
drones-seen as robotic weapons of war-continuing this evolution. 12 As
new surveillance technology arises in police procedure it will present new
legal and practical challenges for courts and practitioners under the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 14 of
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.' 3 The clash between surveillance
technology and individual privacy blurs the legal lines of search, seizure
and suppression matters in Massachusetts and beyond. 14
Part II of this note will trace the historical development of aerial
and other technological means of surveillance in a search and seizure
context from the Supreme Court of the United States and Massachusetts.
Furthermore, Part II summarizes the general scope of warrant requirements
and exigencies permitting warrantless, police protective intrusions that are
often accomplished with technology. Part III.B & D discusses the Federal
and state regulatory schemes upon potential domestic drone surveillance by
law enforcement. In addition, Part III.A outlines the current capabilities of
domestic drones. Part III.C discusses some recent federal case law on the
Fourth Amendment relative to unreasonable "seizures" in the U.S. drone
strikes that killed American citizen and al-Qaeda operative, Anwar alAulaqi. Part IV analyzes the relevant Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
surrounding technological searches and evaluates the proposed legislative
schemes on domestic drones and law enforcement. Furthermore, this piece
10 See Curt Brown, State, Local Police Turn To Robots For Help With Sensitive Situations,
SOUTH COAST TODAY (Oct. 2, 2013, 5:57 AM),
http://www.southcoasttoday.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID-/20131002/NEWS/310020333.
"The
trade-off is you're sending in machinery instead of a human if there is a problem." Id.
11 See Chris Schlag, The New Privacy Battle: How Expanding the Use of Drones Continues
to Erode Our Concept ofPrivacy andPrivacy Rights, 13 PGH. J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 1, 22 (2013)
(warning about immense privacy concerns regarding domestic drones).
12 See Alex Ramirez, To Protect and Serve? Police Militarizationfrom "Urban Shield" Has
Boston Residents Worried, SPARE CHANGE NEWS (May 29, 2014), available at
http://www. sparechangenews.net/news/protect-serve-police-militarization-urban-shield-bostonresidents-worried/ (discussing police militarization in Boston during recent training operations).
13 See Matthew L. Burow, The Sentinel Clouds Above the Nameless Crowd: Protecting
Anonymity from Domestic Drones, 39 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 427, 456
(2013) ("[The] only impediment to domestic law enforcement use of UASs and their frightening
surveillance capabilities is paperwork and bureaucratic red tape . . . [the FAA should] be
evaluating the privacy implications of this technology.").
14 See John Villasenor, Privacy, Security and Human Dignity in the Digital Age:
ObservationsfromAbove: UnmannedAircrat Systems and Privacy, 36 HARV. JL. & PUB. POL'Y
457, 486-98 (2013) (analyzing Fourth Amendment implications of drone use in light of relevant

Supreme Court precedent).
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will provide the legal framework for the integration of domestic drones
within limited emergency and exigent circumstances. Finally, this note
will argue that the use of drone technology for criminal investigations
should be discouraged by the courts and legislature through forceful
regulation and judicial scrutiny.
II. HISTORY
A. US. Supreme Court & Technological Searches
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects
individuals from unreasonable police searches.' 5 The legal definition of a
search was once confined to only actions that served as a physical intrusion
upon an individual's constitutionally protected place .16 In Katz v. United
States, the Supreme Court of the United States overruled this delineation of

a search and prescribed a new scope of a search to encompass Fourth
Amendment protection wherever an individual maintains a "reasonable
expectation of privacy."' 7 Following Katz, the Court began to balance the
15

U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Thomas K. Clancy, The Framer'sIntent: John Adams, His

Era, andthe Fourth Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979, 989 (2010) (discussing historical context of
drafting Fourth Amendment and its relation to Massachusetts Constitution); Jeffrey Rosen,
Madison's Privacy Blind Spot, N.Y. TIMEs (Jan. 18, 2014), availableat

http://www.nytimes.com/20 14/01/19/opiniion/sunday/madisons-privacy-blind-spot.htm?src-recg
(analyzing gap between founding era's drafting of Fourth Amendment and current state of
technological surveillance).
16 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (limiting Fourth Amendment
protection to searches of person, house, papers, or effects), overruled in part by Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The Court examined a police warrantless wiretap action and noted
that because of no physical intrusion into the suspect's home by police, the use of such
technology was not unconstitutional. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 354-56. The Court
reasoned that the evidence having been "unethically secured" by what amounted to a trespass
under state law, provided no grounds for its exclusion. See id.But see Olmstead, 277 U.S. at
478-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis lamented that the framers "conferred, as
against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the
Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a
violation of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 478-79.
17 Katz, 389 U.S. at 350. The Court held that warrantless electronic surveillance upon
an
individual in a public phone booth was a search and thus rejected the "physical intrusion" test.
Id. Specifically, the Court emphasized that the purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to protect
people rather than places alone. Id. However, Justice White was eager to include that the Fourth
Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional "right to privacy." Id.; see
Christopher Slobogin, The Future of the Constitution: Is the Fourth Amendment Relevant in a
Technological Age?, GOVERNANCE STUDIES AT BROOKINGS 11-15 (Dec. 8, 2010),

http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/research/files/papers/20 10/12/08%/204th%/20amendment%/2 0 s
lobogin/1208 4th amendment slobogin.pdf (highlighting inadequacies of amendment developed
in eighteenth century for protecting privacy in digital age).
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clash between privacy interests and police interest in security through
modem technology. 8
After William Rehnquist became Chief Justice in the 1980s, the
Supreme Court thrice determined that aerial surveillance did not invade an
individual's "reasonable expectation of privacy," and thus was not a search
under the Fourth Amendment. 19 As new technology emerged, the Supreme
Court revived its role as constitutional referee between privacy and security
interests. Specifically, in Kyllo v. United States, Justice Scalia concluded
that if the government uses a device that is "not in general public use" to
discover specifics of the interior of a home that are otherwise discoverable
only by a physical invasion, this constitutes a search that requires a warrant
in order to comply with the Fourth Amendment. 20 In other words, Kyllo
18 Katz, 389 U.S. at 350; see United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984).

As Justice

White explained, "[i]t is the exploitation of technological advances that implicates the Fourth
Amendment, not their mere existence." Karo, 468 U.S. at 712.
19 See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214-15 (1986) (holding warrantless aerial
observation from airplane at lawful altitude upon private yard is not search); Dow Chem. Co. v.
United States 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (maintaining even with advanced photography, aerial
surveillance of private company facilities was not search); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450-57
(1989) (concluding aerial surveillance from helicopter of residential backyard greenhouse does
not constitute search). The Court underscored that so long as the aerial surveillance complied
with Federal Aviation regulations, and thus authorities were in a lawful vantage point, neither
private citizens nor companies had a reasonable expectation of privacy from such observation.
Riley, 488 U.S. at 445. But see id. at 452-56 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (questioning majority's
reliance on compliance with FAA regulations in privacy analysis). Justice Brennan dissented,
arguing that the focus ought to be on whether the police surveillance invaded a legitimate privacy
interest rather than examining the vantage point of police. See id. at 456 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
Justice Brennan warned his colleagues of the risk this precedent would set: "[imagine a
helicopter capable of hovering just above an enclosed courtyard or patio without generating any
noise, wind.. without posing any threat of injury. Suppose the police employed this miraculous
tool to discover.. what books they were reading and who their dinner guests were." Id. at 462;
see Brief for Respondent, California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (No. 84-1513); 1985 WL
669865, at *31 [hereinafter CiraoloRespondent'sBrie]. The respondent lamented the court, "the
time to stop warrantless technological surveillance is now, before it gets out of hand and before it
changes the nature of our society. The airplane involved in our case does not lift the police above
the law or the constitution." Ciraolo Respondent's Brief supra, at *31; see Brief for Respondent,
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (No. 87-764); 1987 WL 880078, at *8-16 [hereinafter Riley
Respondent's Brie] (arguing there is a legitimate expectation of privacy within home and
curtilage from aerial observation). The respondent in Riley argued:
To allow an aerial search of a person's home or curtilage merely because the vantage
point may have been where a law enforcement officer technically had a legal right to
be, ignores reasonable privacy expectations in the home and reverts to the analysis of
Fourth Amendment protection referenced to physical intrusion or trespass. Such
analysis fails to consider the use of technology to assist in surveillance and would
expose the intimate lives of citizens to the government watching from the sky.
Riley Respondent's Brief supra, at * 11.
20 Kyllo v. United States, 553 U.S. 27, 34-35.
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announced that the government's use of technologies that are not in
"general public use" for warrantless surveillance is presumptively
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 2' Most recently, the Court
universally determined that the use of GPS monitoring upon a transient
vehicle was within the suspect's "reasonable expectation of privacy" and
consequently a search.22 Most recently, the Court addressed police drug
21

See id. Here the police utilized a thermal imaging device to scan a private home suspected

of manufacturing marijuana without a warrant. See id While there was no literal, physical
infringement, Justice Scalia reminded that, "we rejected such a mechanical interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment in Katz, where the eavesdropping device picked up only sound waves that
reached the exterior of the phone booth." Id. Additionally, the Court emphasized its need to
adapt modem technology with historical interpretations of the Constitution because it "would be
foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has
been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology." Id. at 33; see Brief Amicus Curiae of the
National Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys and the American Civil Liberties Union, in
Support of Petitioner, Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (No. 99-8508), 2000 WL
1706774 [hereinafter Kyllo Amicus Brie]. Despite a favorable holding for the petitioner, Justice
Scalia's opinion did not mitigate the broad concern that recent decisions "have not yielded a
controlling framework for determining when technology implicates the Fourth Amendment."
Kyllo Amicus Brief supra, at *24. But see Quin M. Sorenson Losing the PlainMeaning of Katz:
The Loss of a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Under the Readily Available Standard, 107
DICK. L. REv. 179, 180-181 (2002) (arguing that Kyllo marks departure from existing precedent
and will produce practical problems in application). Mr. Sorenson's predictions that Kyllo's
"general public use" or "readily available" standard will prove difficult to apply has potential
merit, judging by the fact that a thermal imaging device, which is more advanced than the one in
Kyllo, may now be purchased as a $350 iPhone 5 add on. See Xiomara Blanco, Flir One turns
iPhone into personal thermal imaging device, CNET (Jan. 7, 2014 9:23 PM),
http://www.cnet.com/8301-35299 1-576 16847/flir-one-turns-iphone-into-personal-thernalimaging-device/#ixzz2wWiHzliL (explaining birdwatchers, hunters, and campers can all benefit
from the ability to visualize heat in their respective activities); see also Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31
("[T]he imager did not expose any intimate details of Kyllo's life, only amorphous hot spots on
the roof and exterior wall .... ") (internal quotation marks omitted).
22 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). The Court refused to clarify if such a
search consequentially carried with it the requirement of a warrant. See id. at 954; cf United
States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("This approach is ill
suited for the digital age... [b]ut whatever the societal expectations, they can attain
constitutionally protected status only if our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat
secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy."); Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D. D.C. 2013)
(ruling NSA warrantless metadata program violated Fourth Amendment). Judge Leon insisted
that the rise of twenty-first century technology often "infringes on 'that degree of privacy' that the
Founders enshrined in the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, I have little doubt that the author of our
Constitution, James Madison, who cautioned us to beware 'the abridgement of freedom of the
people by gradual and silent encroachments by those in power,' would be aghast." Klayman, 957
F. Supp. 2d. at 42. But see United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1126-27 (9th Cir.
2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). Ninth Circuit Judge Kozinski lambasted his colleagues, "[t]he
needs of law enforcement, to which my colleagues seem inclined to refuse nothing, are quickly
making personal privacy a distant memory. 1984 may have come a bit later than predicted but
it's here at last." Id. at 1121; see, e.g., Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945
(2012) (No. 10-1259), 2011 WL 4614427 at *11 (discussing balance between privacy and
invasive government technology); Tom Goldstein, Jones Confounds the Press, SCOTUSBLOG
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detection dogs as a form of invasive technology under the Fourth
Amendment.2 3 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia declared that a
police drug detection dog sniff upon a private residence amounted to a
search under the Fourth Amendment.24
Perhaps the most pivotal Fourth Amendment privacy interests
versus technological search case of the Roberts Court belongs to its
unanimous decision in Riley v. California.25 The Supreme Court held that
the warrantless intrusion upon an arrestee's cell phone violated the Fourth
Amendment.2 6 As Chief Justice Roberts claimed, of the pervasive nature of
cell phones and personal privacy information, ". . many of the more than
90% of American adults who own a cell phone keep on their person a
digital record of nearly every aspect of their lives-from the mundane to
the intimate. 27
B. MassachusettsSupreme JudicialCourt & Technological Searches
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has remained
consistent with the nation's high Court in concluding that aerial
surveillance by police is not a search and thus does not trigger Fourth
Amendment or Massachusetts State Constitutional protections. 28
(Jan. 25, 2012, 11:30 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/01/jones-confounds-the-press/
(highlighting Court's discrepancy between defining police action as search without determining
its unreasonableness); Adam Liptak, Justices Say GPS Tracker Violated Privacy Rights, N.Y.
TIWES, (Jan. 23, 2012), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/20 12/01/24/us/police-use-of-gps-is-rued-unconstitutional.htm.
23 See Floridav. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1413 (2013).
24 See id. at 1418-20 ( Kagan, J. concurring) (describing drug detection dogs as sophisticated
police technology). Justice Kagan plainly insists, "[drug detection police dogs] are to the poodle
down the street as high-powered binoculars are to a piece of plain glass. Like the binoculars, a
drug-detection dog is a specialized device for discovering objects not in plain view (or plain
smell)." Id. at 1418; cf United States v. Almeida, No. 2:1l-CR-127-DBH, 2012 WL 75751, at
*10 (D. Me. Jan. 9, 2012) (distinguishing between scope of police K-9 vehicle search for drugs
and technological searches). Specifically, this Court explained, "these cases cannot be fairly read
to approve of a search of the interior of a vehicle, absent probable cause, by human hand, pole
camera, or drone, any of which would be the product of human design rather than animal
instinct." Almeida, 2012 WL 75751, at *10. But see Jeffrey Rosen- Where there is No Darkness:
Technology and the Future of Privacy: Symposium Keynote Address, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 965
(2013) ("[Recent rulings] provide[d] little guidance for how to regulate ubiquitous surveillance
that doesn't involve a physical intrusion."); Jim Harper, Escaping Fourth Amendment Doctrine
After Jones: Physics, Law, and Privacy Protection, CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW (2012),
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/supreme-court-review/20 12/9/scr-20 12harper.pdf (advocating abandonment of Katz expectation of privacy approach).
25 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
26 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485.
27 Id. at 2490.
28 See Commonwealth v. One 1985 Ford Thunderbird Auto., 624 N.E.2d 547 (Mass. 1993)
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Additionally, the Massachusetts judiciary clarified using the plain view
doctrine that where police are within a lawful vantage point, no reasonable
expectation of privacy exists and, therefore, any observation of criminality
is lawfully obtained. 29 However, Massachusetts's courts further specified

that where police enter a private area to warrantlessly eavesdrop, such
action is outside the scope of the plain view doctrine and warrants,

constitutional protection as an unreasonable search. 0 Massachusetts courts
have met electronic police surveillance through modem technology with
skepticism and have largely barred its warrantless use by statute and the

state

constitution. 3 For

example, the

Massachusetts

General

Court

legislatively granted narrow statutory authority for police to conduct
electronic monitoring of criminal enterprises, but warned of the grave
dangers such police technology poses to privacy interests.32 However, such
(maintaining aerial surveillance from legal vantage point is not search). The Massachusetts high
court considered the legality of the police's vantage point and level of public access to the
location, the nature of the surveillance and area viewed. Id. at 607. Justice Greaney concluded,
"when the police have a reasonable suspicion that illegal activity is occurring in a backyard, and
engage in brief, foreseeable aerial surveillance from a reasonable altitude where they have a right
to be, it has not been demonstrated that an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy has been
violated." Id. at 610. However, Justice Greaney cautioned that the holding was not suggesting
that "a person has no expectation of privacy from government intrusion in his or her backyard, or
that aerial surveillance without a warrant can never amount to a search for purposes of art. 14."
Id. But see, e.g., People v. Cook, 710 P.2d 299 (Cal. 1985) (defining warrantless aerial
surveillance as search under California state constitution); State v. Bryant, 950 A.2d 467 (Vt.
2008) (holding that warrantless aerial surveillance from lawful altitude was search under
Vermont's state constitution); State v. Davis, 321 P.3d 955 (N.M. App. 2014) (labeling
warrantless aerial surveillance as a search under New Mexico state constitution), cert. granted,
324 P.3d 376 (N.M. 2014).
29 See One 1985 Ford ThunderbirdAuto., 624 N.E.2d at 610.
30 See Commonwealth v. Pannetti, 547 N.E.2d 46, 48 (Mass. 1989) ("[S]ociety should honor
the privacy interests that apartment dwellers and condominium owners have in being free from
warrantless eavesdropping by police who have infiltrated crawl spaces and other areas to which
neither the public nor any other occupant of the multiple dwelling has access.").
31 See Commonwealth v. Tavares, 945 N.E.2d 329, 339 (Mass. 2011) (holding wiretap of
gangs failed to satisfy requirements of Massachusetts wiretap law).
32 See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 272, § 99 (2012) (expressing statutory and more restrictive
provisions for obtaining warrant for electronic surveillance); cf MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 276, § 2
(2012) (outlining standard of probable cause for issuance of search warrant). But see generally
Commonwealth v. Robertson, 5 N.E.3d 522 (Mass. 2014), superseded by 2014 Mass. Acts 43
"An Act Relative to Unlawful Sexual Surveillance," availableat
https://malegislature.gov/Laws/SessionLaws/Acts/2014/Chapter43. The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court failed to include a private man's act of sexual voyeurism using a cell phone to take
photographs of an unsuspecting women's private area. See id; see also Press Release, Governor
Patrick, Governor Patrick Signs "An Act Relative to Unlawful Sexual Surveillance" (Mar. 7,
2014) [hereinafter PressRelease Governor], available at
http://www.mass.gov/governor/pressoffice/pressreleases/2014/0307-governor-signs-voyeurismbill.html. Within days of the Supreme Judicial Court decision, the legislature amended the state' s
"peeping tom" law to include "upskirting" by private individuals upon others in a public area.
PressRelease Governor, supra. This case highlights the important distinction between
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strict interpretation of electronic surveillance laws by the courts has
sparked criticism from the Commonwealth's
law enforcement
community.33 Finally, Massachusetts' high court offered a guideline for
the Supreme Court's future holding in United States v. Jones34where the

state court determined that GPS monitoring was indeed a search.
C. ConstitutionalScope ofPolice Searches With a Warrant

The Fourth Amendment prescribes that "no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
• , 35
seized.
The warrant requirement protects personal liberty and privacy
from baseless government intrusion through judicial impartiality and a
legitimate showing of probable cause. 36 Furthermore, Massachusetts's
courts have highlighted the importance of search warrants because they
specifically define the scope of the search, provide notice to the persons
being searched and show the justification for the police's action.37 Under
the Constitution, the Supreme Court has held that a determination of

probable cause for a search warrant rests only upon a consideration of the
"totality of the circumstances."3
However, Massachusetts state courts
government action and private action in regards to digital surveillance and privacy concerns. See
Robertson, 5 N.E.3d at 529-30. Quite simply, the Fourth Amendment and Massachusetts Article
14 provide no protection of privacy rights from non-government action. Id.
33 See Press Release, Mass. Att'y Gen. Martha Coakley, AG Coakley Stresses Importance of
Update to Wiretap Law in Testimony to Legislature (July 9, 2013) [hereinafter Press Release
Att y Gen.], available at http://www.mass.gov/ago/news-and-updates/press-releases/2013/2013 07-09-wiretap-testimony.htnl ("AG Coakley emphasized the important safeguards already in
place that require judicial approval and lengthy affidavits documenting why a warrant is needed
to investigate alleged criminal activity."); see also H.3261, 188th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2013),
availableat https://malegislature.gov/Bills/188/House/H3261.
34 See Commonwealth v. Rousseau, 990 N.E.2d 543, 548 (Mass. 2013) (holding vehicle
passengers have reasonable expectation of privacy from persistent electronic surveillance of
GPS); Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356, 366 (Mass. 2009) (concluding GPS device
interferes with reasonable expectation of privacy).
35 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
36 See 1 WAYNE LAFAvE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT §

4.1(a) (5th ed. 2012) (discussing rationale of warrant requirement). But see Akhil Reed Amar,
Fourth Amendment FirstPrinciples,107 HARV. L. REv. 757, 766-67 (1994) ("If any members of
the early Congresses objected to or even questioned these warrantless searches and seizures on
Fourth Amendment grounds, supporters of the so-called warrant requirement have yet to identify
them.").
37 See Commonwealth v. Guaba, 632 N.E.2d 1217, 1222 (Mass. 1994) (discussing rationale
for search warrants).
38 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983) (rejecting stricter approach to
determining probable cause of search warrant). As Chief Justice Rehnquist insists, challenges to
a search warrant must be viewed with the "commonsense, practical question whether there is
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have required a more stringent threshold to meet the probable cause

standard of search warrants because the Massachusetts State Constitution
"provides more substantive protection to criminal defendants than does the
Fourth Amendment in the determination of probable cause. '39 In addition
to the higher threshold for probable cause under the Massachusetts State

Constitution, the Commonwealth's search warrant statute provides an
additional layer of requirements for the issuance of a search warrant with
probable cause. 40

Under Massachusetts's law, the nature of the police

search pursuant to a warrant may trigger more statutory and procedural
protections of individual privacy. 41 For example, Massachusetts's police
must comply with the requirements of the Commonwealth's so-called
"Wiretap Statute," which bans electronic surveillance with a wiretap unless
the suspect is connected to an organized, criminal enterprise.42
Beyond search warrants, courts have allowed additional types of

protective sweeps such a "search incident to arrest., 43 Specifically, where
police make a lawful arrest, they may conduct a protective search of the
area within the suspect's "immediate control" for potential weapons. 44
'probable cause' to believe that contraband or evidence is located in a particular place." Id. at
230.
39 See Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548, 555-57 (Mass. 1985) (rejecting "totality of
the circumstances" test for showing of probable cause).
40 See MASS GEN. LAW ch. 276, § 2B (2012) (codifying more procedural requirements
than
simply determination of probable cause); see also RICHARD G. STEARNS, MASSACHUSETTS'S
PROSECUTOR'S GUIDE, SEARCHES WITH WARRANTS (33rd ed.) (2013); MASSACHUSETTS
CONTINUING LEGAL

EDUCATION: MASSACHUSETTS

SUPERIOR

COURT CRIMINAL PRACTICE

§ 7.3.2 (overview of challenging probable cause in issuance of search warrant);
MASSACHUSETTS SUPERIOR COURT CRIMINAL PRACTICE MANUAL § 7.3.3 (discussing practical
issues of wiretap search warrants).
41 See MASS. GEN. LAW ch. 272, § 99 (2012) (Massachusetts wiretap statute);
Commonwealth v. Scalise, 439 N.E.2d 818, 822 (Mass. 1982) (requiring police to obtain prior
judicial approval to justify "no-knock" search warrant). Massachusetts's courts require an
additional showing of probable cause to believe that target of the "no-knock" search warrant may
discard contraband, pose a risk to police or simply flee. Scalise, 439 N.E.2d at 823; cf Richards
v. Wisconsin 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997) (requiring only reasonable suspicion for "no-knock"
warrant execution).
42 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.272, § 99B(7); see also Commonwealth v. Penta, 669 N.E.2d
767, 771 (Mass. 1996) (discussing "organized crime" connection required within wiretap law); cf
18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2012) ("Prohibiti[ng]...use as evidence of intercepted wire or oral
communications."). Under federal law, a wiretap cannot be executed unless "traditional
investigative techniques would suffice to expose [a] crime." See United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S.
143, 153 n.12 (1974).
43 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (discussing reasonableness of
"search incident to arrest" under Fourth Amendment). The Court defined a search incident to
arrest (predicated upon a lawful arrest) as search that is "'reasonably limited' by the 'need to
seize weapons' and 'to prevent the destruction of evidence." Id. at 764 (quoting Sibron v. New
York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968)).
44 See id. at 763.

MANUAL
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However, the Supreme Court has since expanded the scope of such
protective searches incident to arrest to include a full "cursory" sweep of a
premise to ensure no third-party danger to police. 45 Similar to searches
incident to arrest, the Supreme Court has authorized police to initiate entry
into a dwelling where they have a legal arrest, accompanied by "reason to
believe the suspect is within," even in the absence of a warrant specifically
authorizing entry into the home. 46 However, the Supreme Court denied
police the authority to enter a private home without a warrant, even if they
have probable cause to 47believe that people who recently committed a
violent crime are therein.
D. ConstitutionalScope of WarrantlessPoliceAction
A warrantless government intrusion upon a legitimate expectation
of privacy is presumed to be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.48
45 See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 326 (1990); see also United States v. Winston, 444
F.3d 115, 118 (1st Cir. 2006) (discussing extent of protective sweeps within private residence).
The Winston court further clarified that:

[T]o prevent law enforcement from abusing the protective sweep by using it as a
pretext for searching an individual's home, the Supreme Court has limited its use.
First, law enforcement officers conducting the sweep must have a reasonable suspicion
of danger: there must be articulable facts which, taken together with the rational
inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing
that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest
scene.
Winston, 444 F.3d at 118 (quoting Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
46 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980). The Supreme Court concluded, "for
Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with
it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to
believe the suspect is within." Id. at 574; see Paul E. Brown, ArrestAt The Castle: Payton v. New
York, 42 LA. L. REV. 269, 282 (1981) (praising Court's balance between privacy and effective
law enforcement). Professor Brown highlighted the balancing test invoked by the Court and
determined that:
New techniques are needed to halt the spiraling in- crease in crime. However, the
privacy rights of our citizens should not be sacrificed unless some purposeful
advantage is given to our law enforcement officials. From this standpoint, the Payton
decision appears very sound indeed, for it grants individuals protections guaranteed by
the Constitution and, at the same time, gives society the protection it needs in a time of
greatly increasing crime.
Brown, supra at 281-82 (internal quotation marks omitted).
47 See Minnesota v. Olson 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990) (barring warrantless entry by police to
make arrest). The Court specified that absent exigent circumstances, such as reasonable risk of
danger to law enforcement or others, warrantless entry violated the Fourth Amendment. Id.
48 See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971) (declaring narrowness of
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However, this presumption against warrantless police conduct as
unreasonable is not absolute .49 In limited circumstances, American courts
have permitted so-called protective searches for weapons as "a limited
intrusion designed solely to insure the safety of the police officer and
others while the officer is conducting a criminal investigation."50 If exigent

circumstances present themselves, such as "hot pursuit," an objective
concern for officer safety or destruction of evidence, or other emergency
situations, American courts have relaxed the warrant requirement and

determined such action may not be unreasonable."

The Supreme Court

conceived this police authority in Terry v.Ohio, where an investigatory
street encounter between police and an individual led to a limited "pat
frisk" for weapons, now commonly referred to as a "stop and frisk." The

exigent circumstances exception to the warrant clause of the Fourth
Amendment does not dissolve the legal requirement of probable cause. 5 2
Therefore, in cases involving warrantless searches and the state cites an
exigency, they must show the objective requirement of both probable cause
and a legitimate exigency within the context of the police action.53 The
Supreme Court of the United States has granted law enforcement some
latitude for warrantless searches where police are pursuing a felony suspect
and immediate action was necessary to protect "their lives and others." 54 In
line with the hot pursuit exigency rationale for safety interests, police may

lawful warrantless searches).
49 See Payton, 445 U.S. at 585-87 (discussing general exceptions to warrant requirement).
50

Thomas K. Clancy, Protective Searches, Pat Downs, or Frisks?: The Scope of Permissive

Intrusion to Ascertain if a DetainedPerson is Armed, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 491, 491 (1999); see

also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (establishing Constitutionality of warrantless "stop and
frisk" under limited circumstances).
51 See Payton, 445 U.S. at 585-87 (1980). Exigent Circumstances has been broadly defined
as:
[An emergency situation requiring swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or
serious damage to property, or to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect, or
destruction of evidence. There is no ready litmus test for determining whether such
circumstances exist, and in each case the extraordinary situation must be measured by
the facts known to the officers.
People v. Ramey, 545 P.2d 1333, 1341 (Cal. 1976).
52 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 (establishing constitutionality of stop and frisk); 3 LAFAvE,

supra note 36, § 6.6(a)-(c).
53 See 14A MASS. PRAC., SUMMARY OF BASIC LAW § 7.63 (4th ed.) (summarizing exigent
circumstances and their exception to warrant requirement under Massachusetts law).
54 See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 278-279 (1967) (establishing hot pursuit warrant
exception under Fourth Amendment); see also Commonwealth v. Forde, 329 N.E.2d 717, 723
(Mass. 1975) (discussing contextual factors allowing for warrantless search during "hot pursuit");
cf Welshv. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 741 (1984) (declining to extend hot pursuit exception to all
circumstances).
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make a warrantless intervention when they have a reasonable belief under
the totality of the circumstances that a person is in imminent danger or
presently injured. 5
Likewise, during extraordinary and dangerous
circumstances where police maintain a reasonable belief that a warrantless
intrusion is imperative to protecting the public or themselves from the risk
of imminent or ongoing harm, such action is not unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.56 In contrast to the exigency warrant exceptions
involving the interest of evidentiary preservation, the emergency
exception's primary purpose is preventing harm and ensuring safety rather
than centering upon a criminal investigation.5 7 For example, cases
involving a imminent risk of explosives or an active shooter, typically
provide police with a wider latitude for warrantless action within the
framework of the emergency exception. 58 The emergency exception is no
55 See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (laying out emergency
circumstances exception); see also Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 211-12 (D.C. Cir.
1963). Prior to ascending to the nation's highest court, Chief Justice Warren Burger defended an
emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement:

[A] warrant is not required to break down a door to enter a burning home to rescue
occupants or extinguish a fire, to prevent a shooting or to bring emergency aid to an
injured person. The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is
justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency.
Fires or dead bodies are reported to police by cranks where no fires or bodies are to be
found. Acting in response to reports of 'dead bodies,' the police may find the 'bodies'
to be common drunks, diabetics in shock, or distressed cardiac patients. But the
business of policemen and firemen is to act, not to speculate or meditate on whether the
report is correct. People could well die in emergencies if police tried to act with the
calm deliberation associated with the judicial process. Even the apparently dead often
are saved by swift police response. A myriad of circumstances could fall within the
terms exigent circumstances' ... e.g., smoke coming out a window or under a door, the
sound of gunfire in a house, threats from the inside to shoot through the door at police,
reasonable grounds to believe an injured or seriously ill person is being held within.
Wayne, 318 F.2d at 212.
56 See United States v. Beaudoin, 362 F.3d 60, 66 (1st Cir. 2004); see also Mincey v.

Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978). The Court explained in dicta, that "warrantless entries and
searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid" are not
unlawful under the Fourth Amendment. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392; see People v. Sirhan, 497 P.2d
1121 (Cal. 1972) (controversial ruling allowing warrantless search in aftennath of Senator Robert
Kennedy's assassination).
57 See Mor v. City of Gaithersburg, 519 F.3d 216, 222 (4th Cir. 2008) (highlighting
pragmatic nature of emergency exception to warrant requirement). "We are to approach the
Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause with at least some measure of pragmatism. If
there is a grave public need for the police to take preventive action, the Constitution may impose
limits, but it will not bar the way." Id. at 222.
58 See United States v. Infante, 701 F.3d 386, 393 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding that immediate
risk of gas explosion justified warrantless entry); United States v. Sullivan, 711 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.
1983) (risk object suspected of being explosive device); United States v. Williams, 626 F.2d 697,
703 (9th Cir. 1980) (warrantless entry after bomb threat deemed not unreasonable);
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blank check for unconstrained police action, because warrantless searches

are an exception to the Fourth Amendment, the state bears the burden of
showing that an objective emergency existed under the totality of the

circumstances .59
III. FACTS
A. Capabilitiesof Domestic UAVs
While UAVs, or drones, have gained wide notoriety through their
airstrikes in the U.S. military's counterterrorism strategy, domestic drones
have a more diverse application.60 Unlike the infamous U.S. military
"Predator Drone," more modestly constructed UAVs can be as small as an
61
insect, and often bear a closer resemblance to helicopters than fighter jets.
Additionally, UAV technology has increasingly been applied to civilian
applications by hobbyists, archeologists, college campuses, farmers,
commercial photography, rescue operators, animal conservationists, and
fire fighters.62
Commonwealth v. Marchione, 422 N.E.2d 1362, 1364 (Mass. 1981) (report of potentially
explosive device and warrantless entry for removal was lawful). See generally 3 LAFAVE, Supra
note 36, § 6.6(a)-(d).
59 See 14A MASS. PRAC., supra note 53 (discussing practical aspects of confronting exigent
circumstances).
60 See Kimberly Dozier, US Defends Drones,Rejects Findingsof
Rights Groups,BOS.
GLOBE (Oct. 23, 2013), available at
http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/20 13/1 /22/human-rights-groups-criticize-droneprogram/ObEnS6fP7ELMMJNdzHAPAM/story.html (describing White House push back on
military drone policy in combatting terrorism); Lev Grossman, Drone Home: They Fight and Spy
for America Abroad. But What Happens When DronesReturn Home?, TIME MAGAZINE (Feb. 11,
2013), available at
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2135132,00.html?artld-2135132?contType
-article?chn-us (detailing application of drones on domestic front); see also Daisy Carrington &
Jenny Soffel, 15 Ways Drones Will Change Your Life, CNN (Nov. 18, 2013, 5:23 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/03/business/meet-your-friendly-neighborhooddrones/index.html?sr-fb1 10413dronesl2p (outlining immense scope of UAV application).
61 See
PREDATOR
UAS,
GENERAL
ATOMICS
AERONAUTICAL,
http://www.gaasi.com/products/aircraft/predator.php (last visited Mar. 20, 2014); The Drone Father, THE
(Dec. 1, 2012), available at http://www.economist.com/news/technologyquarterly/21567205 -abe-karem-created-robotic-plane-transfonned-way-modern-warfare
(conducting profile of man that invented Predator Drone); see also Elisabeth Bumiller & Thom
Shanker, War Evolves With Drones, Some Tiny as Bus, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 19, 2011), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/20/world/20drones.html?ref-unmannedaerialvehicles&_r-0
(discussing diverse technology of UAVs).
62 See Vince Ambrosia, Observing Wildfires: Demonstrating Uses of UAS for Civilian
Disaster Monitoring, SAN FRANCISCO
STATE
UNIVERSITY
(Oct.
23,
2013),
http://geog.sfsu.edu/content/vincent-ambrosia-nasa-using-drones-wildfire-work
(lecturing on
capabilities of UAVs to aid during wildfires and other emergency situations); Carrington &
ECONOMIST

2014-2015]

A DIGITAL ALBATROSS

On the law enforcement side, aerial operations and unmanned
robotics have long been utilized in countless police operations in the United
States and Massachusetts.63
Currently, the Mesa County Sheriff
Department in Colorado remains one of the few law enforcement agencies
using UAVs in police operations. 64
The Mesa County Sheriff's
Department has obtained approval from the Federal Aviation
Administration ("FAA") and utilizes a "Draganflyer X6" UAV in
operations such as aerial photos of severe automobile accidents, assistance
to fire departments during large scale fires, and high-risk suspect
apprehension.65 In fact, a North Dakota man was apprehended with the
help of a U.S. Border Patrol predator
drone, used for surveillance, during
66
an armed standoff with police.
B. FederalRegulation ofDomestic UA Vs
While federal courts have yet to confront the issue of domestic
drones and law enforcement, Congress enacted broad domestic drone
guidelines through an omnibus Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
funding act.67 The Federal law mandates that the FAA establish a

Soffel, supra note 60 (outlining immense scope of UAV application); see also James Surowiecki,
Why Drone Delivery Won't Replace the UPS Guy, THE NEW YORKER (Dec. 5, 2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/ nine/blogs/currency/20 13/12/why-drone-delivery-wont-replace-theups-guy.html. Recently, the CEO of Amazon created a media stir when he announced, that his
company was "experimenting with having drones deliver its packages." Surowiecki, supra.
63 See Brown, supra note 10 (discussing role of robotics in local law enforcement); Graham,
supra note 8 (discussing aerial police operation amid Boston Marathon manhunt).
64 See Susan Greene, Mesa County, Colo. A National Leader in Domestic Drone Use, THE
COLORADO
INDEPENDENT,
http://www.coloradoindependent.com/127870/colorados-mesacounty-a-national-leader-in-domestic-drone-use (last visited Feb. 20, 2015) (discussing Mesa
County Sheriff's UAV activity).
See generally The Future of Drones in America: Law
Enforcement and Privacy Considerations: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary United
States Senate, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Benjamin Miller, Unmanned Aircraft Program
Manager, Mesa County Sheriff's Office and Representative of the Airborne Law Enforcement
Association) [hereinafter Senate Hearing], available at judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/3-2013MillerTestimony.pdf (offering three examples of when Mesa County deploys UAVs).
65 See Senate Hearing,supra note 64 (statement of Benjamin Miller).
66 See State v. Brossart, No. 32-2011-CR-00049 (N.D. Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2012). The
North Dakota trial court judge rejected the defendant's motion to dismiss that argued in part, that
the use of the predator drone in his apprehension was an "outrageous" abuse of government. Id.
While local police's use of a U.S. Customs and Border Patrol Predator Drone ought to give us
pause, the manner of its use is compatible with existing law enforcement practices using
technology during high-risk scenarios. See infra Part IV (detailing possible permissible use of
drones by police); see also Thomas A. Bryan, State v. Brossart: Adapting the Fourth Amendment
For a Future With Drones, 63 CATH. U. L. REv. 465, 488-492 (2014) (analyzing specific
circumstances of Brossartcase within Fourth Amendment framework).
67 See 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2012).

132

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XX

"comprehensive plan to safely accelerate the integration" of domestic
drones into American airspace. 681 Under this scheme, any state, local or
federal public entity wishing to utilize domestic drones must be granted a
"Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (COA). 69 While the FAA has
regulatory authority to grant a COA to public safety agencies, the approval
process is decided solely on the basis of safety concerns. 70 Therefore, the
FAA does not outline prohibited uses of domestic drones related to
criminal investigations by law enforcement but simply regulates the
logistics to maintain airspace safety. 71 At present, this Federal regulatory
ambiguity would require federal courts to determine the permissible scope
of UAVs in a law enforcement context.72 In light of this perceived gap
between FAA safety regulations and potential privacy concerns over law
enforcement's use of drones, U.S. Senator for Massachusetts, Ed Markey
filed a bill entitled the "Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of
2013.",7 The central purpose of the bill is to provide "[f]ederal standards
for informing the public and protecting individual privacy with respect to

68 See 47 U.S.C. § 332 (2012).
69
70

See § 40101.
See id; Press Release, Fact Sheet-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), Federal Aviation

Administration (Feb. 19, 2013), available at
http://www.faa.gov/news/fact-sheets/news-story.cfm?newsld-14153 ("As the FAA clarifies their
role as a safety administration and explains that they "evaluate the proposed [public safety UAV]
operation to see if it can be conducted safely."); see also RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG.
RESEARCH SERv., DRONES IN DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS: FOURTH AMENDMENT

IMPLICATIONS AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES 21 (2013), available at

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42701.pdf ("[T]he sheer sophistication of drone technology
and the sensors they can carry may remove drones from this traditional Fourth Amendment
framework."); U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO CONG., UNMANNED AIRCRAFT
SYSTEMS: MEASURING PROGRESS AND ADDRESSING POTENTIAL PRIVACY CONCERNS WOULD

available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648348.pdf.
71 See, e.g., J. Tyler Black, Over Your Head,Under the Radar: An Examination of Changing

FACILITATE INTEGRATION INTO THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM (2012),

Legislation, Aging Case Law, and Possible Solutions to the Domestic Police Drone Puzzle, 70
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1829, 1846-47 (2013); Robert Molko, The Drones are Coming! Will the
Fourth Amendment Stop Their Threat to Our Privacy?, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 1279, 1283-84
(2013); John Villasenor, Observations from Above: Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Privacy, 36
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 457, 472-73 (2013); Patrice Hendriksen, Note, Unmanned and
Unchecked. Confronting the Unmanned Aircraft System Privacy Threat Through Interagency
Coordination, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 207, 229 (2013) (arguing for reforming current legislation
to mandate interagency coordination); see also Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452-56 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (criticizing FAA regulations as inadequate measure of legitimacy of
privacy interests).
72 See infra Part IV.A (analyzing Supreme Court precedent on technology and Fourth
amendment).
71 See S. 1639, 113th Cong. (2013), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/113thcongress/senate-bill/1639/text (providing federal limitations upon public agencies, use of
domestic drones).
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unmanned aircraft systems. 74 Although Senator Markey's bill requires
that police obtain a legal warrant before utilizing drone surveillance in
criminal investigations, the law would allow warrantless drone operation
under limited, exigent circumstances such as an imminent risk of danger or
terrorist activity. 75 Additionally, this amendment to FAA regulations
would limit data collection and prohibits its warrantless use in a criminal
proceeding.76 Aside from regulation of police use of domestic drones,
President Obama has vowed to issue an executive order outlining a
regulatory framework for integrating commercial drones at home.77
C. FourthAmendment UnreasonableSeizure Challenges to US.
CounterterrorismDrone Strikes and Anwar al-Aulaqi
Beyond searches, drones encompass the issue of unreasonable
seizures through the U.S. lethal drone strikes in the so-called "war on
terror.,78 Recently, the Second Circuit ordered the Department of Justice
to disclose a legal memorandum outlining the legal justification for the
2011 lethal drone strike upon American citizen and Al-Qaeda operative,
Id. § 2(7).
75 See id § 341; see also supra Part II.D (outlining exigencies that permit certain warrantless
14

police intrusion).
76 See supra

note 73; see also S. 1016, 113th Cong. (2013), available at
http://beta.congress.gov/bill/l13th-congress/senate-bill/I016. Senator Rand Paul of Kentucky
previously submitted a substantially similar bill that seeks to quell some of the same privacy and
evidentiary concerns subsequently addressed in Senator Markey's bill. See Press Release, Sen.
Paul Introduces Bill to Protect Americans Against Unwarranted Drone Surveillance (Jun. 12,
2012), available at http://www.paul.senate.gov/?p-ressrelease&id-545; see also Chris Schlag,
The New Privacy Battle: How Expanding the Use ofDrones Continues to Erode Our Concept of
Privacy and Privacy Rights, 13 PGH. J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 1, 22 (2013) (noting lack of privacy
regulations in FAA law); Matthew L. Burow, Note, The Sentinel Clouds Above the Nameless
Crowd-ProtectingAnonymityfrom Domestic Drones, 39 N.E. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CON. 427, 456
(2013). Burow warns that the "only impediment to domestic law enforcement use of UASs and
their frightening surveillance capabilities is paperwork and bureaucratic red tape.... [The FAA
should] be evaluating the privacy implications of this new technology." Burow, supra; see infra
Part II.C (discussing importance of warrant requirements); Part IV.C (arguing for need for
statutory warrant requirements for domestic police drones); Part IV.A (advocating for strict
privacy-interest approach to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). See generally Andrea Stone,
Drone Privacy Bill Would Put In Safeguards On Surveillance, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 1, 2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/01/drone-privacy-bill n 1728109.html
(summarizing
two Congressional bills seeking to regulate domestic drones).
77 See Erin Mershon & Kevin Robillard, PresidentBarack Obama To Issue Executive Order
on Drone Privacy, POLITICO (Jul. 23, 2014), available at
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/07/executive-order-drone-privacy-barack-obama109303.html#ixzz38Nv3Qymo.
78 See Archive oj Articles About Anwar al-Aulaqi, N.Y. TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/a/anwar al awlaki/ (last visited Mar.
20, 2014).
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Anwar al-Aulaqi. 7 9 This Department of Justice legal memorandum
revealed the constitutional permissibility for the killing of an American

citizen overseas under the Fourth Amendment.80

Since a Fourth

Amendment analysis is governed by balancing the governmental interest
against the level of intrusion upon the individual, the Department of Justice
theorized that this particular action was reasonable."' The Department of
Justice concluded that "where high-level government officials have
determined that a capture operation overseas is infeasible and that the
targeted person is part of a dangerous enemy force and is engaged in
activities that pose a continued and imminent threat to U.S. persons or
interests. . .the use of lethal force would not violate the Fourth
Amendment."8 2 Almost six months after the Department of Justice drafted
this legal memorandum, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia addressed a lawsuit filed by al-Aulaqi's father against President
Obama.83 The elder al-Aulaqi brought constitutional claims that sought an
injunction against a subsequent drone strikes upon his son and demanded

that the executive branch articulate the standard for such action.8 4 Despite
Judge

Bates'

concession

that the

plaintiff raised

"a

unique

and

extraordinary case," the court deferred the substantive Fourth Amendment
79 See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, No. 13-422, slip op. at 1-2 (2d Cir. Jun. 23, 2014),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/06/23/us/23awlaki-memo.htil
(ordering
Justice Department to release Barron memorandum).
80 See Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen. on Applicability of
Federal Criminal Laws and the Constitution to Contemplated Lethal Operations Against Shaykh
Anwar al-Aulaqi, to U.S. Att'y Gen. (Jul. 16, 2010) [hereinafter Barron Memo], available at
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/06/23/us/23awlaki-memo.html
(outlining
Obama
Administration's legal justification for extraordinary rendition). Of note, David Barron, the
former Department of Justice Legal Counsel and drafter of the abovementioned memorandum, is
far from a faceless government bureaucrat. See generallyDavid J. Barron, United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit, available at http://www.cal.uscourts.gov/david-j-barron. This past
May, Judge Barron was nominated and approved by the U.S. Senate for ajudicial seat on the First
Circuit. See Judicial Nominations, S. 3246, 160 Cong. Rec. (daily ed. May 22, 2014), available
at https://beta.congress.gov/crec/2014/05/22/CREC-2014-05-22.pdf.
The Bay State's two
senators supported Mr. Barron's nomination to their home federal appeals court; Senator Edward
Markey was adamant in his support for Mr. Barron-despite his declaration of a "need [for] a
public debate on drone policy" because he was "not responsible for administration's drone
policy or the decision to authorize an attack." Id. at S3260; see Conor Friedersdorf, 7 Pages That
Gave President Obama the Cover to Kill Americans, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 18, 2014), available
at
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/08/7-pages-that-gave-president-obamapermission-to-kill-americans/378651/. In stark contrast with the Senators from Massachusetts,
libertarian darling Senator Rand Paul opposed "the nomination of anyone who would argue that
the president has the power to kill an American citizen not involved in combat and without a
trial." Friedersdorf, supra (quoting Senator Rand Paul).
8 See BarronMemo, supra note 80 at 97.
82 See id.
83 See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D. D.C. 2010).
84 See id. at 8.
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question and held that the plaintiffs claim lacked standing.8 5 While both
the present and future emotional harm al-Aulaqi's father suffered was not
an abstract injury in a literal sense, this court determined that the plaintiff s
relationship with his son did not rise to the level of obtaining protection of
"substantive rights" under the Fourth Amendment.8 6 As Judge Bates
confessed, "any harm caused to plaintiff as a result of the extrajudicial
killing of his son would be an 'unintended side effect' of government
action having other purposes. 87
In the fall of 2011, Anwar al-Aulaqi was killed by a U.S. drone
strike in Yemen.88 In the wake of al-Aulaqi's death, his family sued then
CIA Director Leon Panetta for illegally seizing al-Aulaqi under the Fourth
Amendment.8 9 However, Judge Collyer granted the government's motion
to dismiss. 90 Judge Collyer rejected the notion that a drone could "seize" a
person since "they are designed to kill, not capture." 91 Thus, the Court held
that without a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, no constitutional claim
could be made on this particular issue.92 In light of these recent federal
cases, the Fourth Amendment offers no refuge for American citizens'
claims against unreasonable "seizures" in the form of counter-terrorism
drone strikes. 93
D. State Regulation ofDomestic UAVs
The federal government has yet to enact substantive privacy
protections from domestic drones, leaving several states to serve as
democratic laboratories on the legal issues of law enforcement and
individual privacy. 94 As of July 2014, thirteen states had enacted statutes

8 See id. at 8-9.
86 See id. at 35.
87 Id.

88 See Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, No. 12-1192, slip op. at 1 (D. D.C. Apr. 4, 2014), available at
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Memorandum Op_4-4-14.pdf.
9 See id.
See id.
91 Id. at 24.
9'

See id.
Cf Al-Aulaqi, slip op. at 1-2 (ruling for defendant on Fourth Amendment seizure issue
regarding oversees drone strikes against American citizen); Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d
1 (D. D.C. 2010) (same).
92

93

94 See Catherine Crump & Jay Stanley, Why Americans Are Saying No to Domestic Drones,

SLATE

(Feb.

11,

2013),

http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future-tense/2013/02/domestic-surveillance-drone-ban
s are sweeping the nation.html (suggesting national movement on state level against domestic
drone surveillance has begun).
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regulating domestic drones in the interest of individual privacy. 95 For
example, each of the subsequent state laws required the police to obtain a
warrant prior to the utilization of a UAV. 9 6 Although the states have
implemented statutory warrant requirements upon domestic drones and law
enforcement, the laws provide emergency exceptions such as national
security crisis or where circumstances pose an imminent risk of danger to
human life based upon reasonable suspicion. 97
In conjunction with the growing trend of state regulation of
domestic drones, the Massachusetts legislature is considering a UAV bill. 98
Introduced by Massachusetts State Senator Robert Hedlund, "An Act to
Regulate the Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles" would provide specific
restrictions upon law enforcement's use of domestic drones such as a
probable cause warrant requirement. 99 Unlike the Massachusetts "wiretap"
statute, which provides heavier judicial oversight to law enforcement's
electronic surveillance, the Massachusetts bill simply authorizes UAV
surveillance with a general search warrant. 1° ° Additionally, similar to
many other state laws on law enforcement and UAVs, the Massachusetts
bill authorizes a warrant exception where a "threat to the life or safety of a
person is imminent. " 1° 1 Furthermore, this proposed law bans any data
collection conducted by law enforcement's use of domestic drones. 102
Finally, any local police or state police department in the Commonwealth
seeking to acquire a UAV must receive authorization by the Secretary of

95 See Allie Bohm, Drone Legislation: What's Being Proposed in the States?, ACLU (Mar.

6, 2013, 3:15 PM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty-national-security/drone-legislation-whatsbeing-proposed-states (discussing state legislation on domestic drones).
96 See id.
97 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 934.50 (2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 21-213
(2012); 725 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 167 (2012) (allowing UAV photography to aid in crime scene investigation); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-13-609 (2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 755-1 (2012) (placing two-year ban on all
domestic drone use in Virginia); H.B. 2710, 77th Leg. Assemb., (Or. 2013); see also TEX. GOV'T
CODE ANN. § 423.4 (2012) (prohibiting all drone photography).

The ACLU notes that this

prohibition may raise future First Amendment issues against the law. See Bohm, supra note 95
(discussing state legislation on domestic drones).
98See Bohm, supra note 95 (providing comprehensive guide to state laws and bills on
domestic drones).
99See
S.1664,
188th
Gen
Ct.
(Mass.
2013),
available
at
https://malegislature.gov/Bills/188/Senate/S 1664.
100 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 2B (2012); see also Commonwealth v. Guaba, 632
N.E.2d 1217, 1222 (Mass. 1994) (providing additional limitations on police use of electronic

eavesdropping in organized crime investigations); cf MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99 (2012).
101 See S.1664; see also supra Part II.D (outlining emergency exception to warrant
requirement).
102

See S.1664.

2014-2015]

A DIGITAL ALBATROSS

the Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety and Security.103
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Future of ElectronicSurveillance Jurisprudence
As enhanced surveillance technology grows in scope and practice,
the Supreme Court of the United States has maintained an unduly analog
perspective in an increasingly digital world. 10 4 Despite recent holdings on
electronic and enhanced surveillance techniques by police, the Court has
failed to adequately articulate the Fourth Amendment's protection. 0 5 For
example, while Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Jones, determined
that the police officer's installation of a Global Positioning System
("GPS") device was a "search" under the Fourth Amendment, the rationale
hinges excessively upon ,18,century" notions of property law and
protections from physical intrusions. 0 6 Scalia's majority opinion in Jones
resembles the holding of Olmstead more than Katz, in that it rests upon a
question of the level of physical intrusion. ' 7 Any technological intrusion
by the government upon an individual's person, home, property and
activities should be considered a search under the Fourth Amendment. 08
Because the property-interest test is based primarily on the level of physical
intrusion upon the individual, it cannot adequately secure people in an
electronic age. 0 9 However, some court commentators have more faith in
the present Court since the Justices seemingly "prepared to apply broad
103 See id.
104 See supra note 21 (highlighting inadequacies of recent Court rulings in protecting privacy
in digital age).
105 See Rosen, supra note 24, at 968-69; cf Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014)

(holding warrantless search incident to arrest of cellphone unconstitutional). Unlike a cell phone
search, the use of a drone is a police technology that intrudes upon privacy rather than police
intruding upon an individual's own technological device. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2487-86.
106 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949-53 (2013). The Majority opinion reflects
the Court's continued bilateral tests of analyzing the degree of physical intrusion under traditional
property law, and the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. See id at 950-51. Justice
Scalia does not abandon the Katz precedent altogether in Jones, but articulates the definition of a

Fourth Amendment "search" with a property-interest approach. See id. at 950. Conversely,
Professor Jeffrey Rosen concluded, "if we are to preserve in the twenty-first century the same
amount of privacy that people took for granted in the eighteenth, the Court may have to act."
Rosen, supra note 24, at 969 (undermining Justice Scalia's view that eighteenth-century property-

interests approach capable of adjudicating twenty-first-century technological issues).
107 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950; see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464
(1928) (focusing on physical intrusion), overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347

(1967).
108See Rosen supra note 24, at 965.
109 See id.
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privacy principles to bring the Fourth Amendment's ban on unreasonable
searches into the digital age."11° Other legal scholars have advocated for
the abandonment of the Katz search test and argued that "the Court should
return to natural-language definitions of 'search' and 'seizure' that can
resolve both common and 'high- tech' Fourth Amendment cases.""'
Instead of departing from decades of Fourth Amendment precedent, the
Court should evolve with emerging technologies and employ an exclusive
privacy-based analysis consistent with Katz.1 2
This pivacy-based
approach to Fourth Amendment cases is preferable to the property-based
test that fails to supply specific "guidance on how to regulate ubiquitous
surveillance that doesn't involve a physical intrusion."" 3 In determining
whether police surveillance through enhanced technology constitutes as a
search, the crux of the analysis should rest upon the reasonableness of an
individual's expectation of privacy under the specific circumstances.114
B. Integrating UA Vs into Existing Laws
Advanced technology such as domestic drones should not be
indiscriminately deemed unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and
Massachusetts Constitution in all circumstances." 5 Where police lack any
reasonable investigative alternative and obtain a search warrant in
compliance with a statute and approved by a judge, drones should be a
lawful tool under the Fourth Amendment. 116 Additionally, during the
execution of a high-risk arrest warrant where police have a reasonable
belief that the subject of the warrant or a third party on the premises may be
armed and presently dangerous, aerial surveillance should be deemed
reasonable to ensure officer and public safety.11 7 While both federal and
Massachusetts state courts should presumptively view warrantless drone
110 See Liptak, supra note 22 (articulating some commentators' optimism of Court evolving
to technological age with jurisprudence on privacy).
l1 See Harper, supra note 24 (urging courts to move beyond Katz).
112 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (establishing reasonable expectation
of privacy approach); see also supra note 21 (commenting on friction between privacy and
security interests raised by technological advancements).
113 See Rosen, supra note 24, at 969 (criticizing property law trespass-like test requiring
physical intrusion).
114 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
115

See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (discussing emergency circumstance and

hot pursuit exceptions to warrantless intervention).
116 See S.1664, 188th Gen Ct. (Mass. 2013), available at
https://malegislature.gov/Bills/188/Senate/S1664 (Massachusetts domestic drone bill); see also
LAFAVE, supra note 36 (discussing importance of warrants).
117

law).

See supra Part II.D (reviewing scope of warrantless police action under state and federal
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surveillance as unreasonable, such devices ought to be lawful during
exigent circumstances." 8 Just as the Massachusetts legislature's drone bill
authorizes, courts should grant police a certain amount of latitude to
operate drone technology during exigent circumstances such as hot pursuit
and imminent danger to human life or public safety. 119 Specifically, law
enforcement drones should be permissible under imminent threats of
terrorism or during the immediate aftermath of terrorist acts where the
public remains at risk.120 The operation of domestic drones in these exigent
circumstances would not be substantially more invasive than existing
practical and legal operations by law enforcement capabilities. 12 1 For
example, the Massachusetts State Police Air Wing unit maintains a handful
of helicopters and the operation of drones can be practically integrated into
22
such a division at a substantially cheaper cost to the Commonwealth.
Additionally, various law enforcement bomb squad units utilized so-called
unmanned ground vehicles to diffuse improvised explosive devices after
the suspects' firefight with police. 123
These "ground drones," often
equipped with cameras aid in the protection of the public and police
personnel during high-risk circumstances. 24
C. Analysis ofMassachusetts Drone Bill
As UAV technology increasingly enters public awareness, the
Massachusetts General Court has rightfully begun to address the issue by
drafting accompanying legislation. 125
The drone regulation bill,
constructed in cooperation with the American Civil Liberties Union of
Massachusetts, aims to protect safety, privacy and civil liberties from
unregulated police drone surveillance. 2 6 Accordingly, the proposed bill
118See cases cited supra Part II.D (outlining case law allowing warrantless searches in

certain emergency scenarios).
119See S.1664 (providing exceptions for police to execute warrantless drone searches).
120 See supra note 55 (reviewing emergency exception cases involving high risk of danger).
121 Cf Villareal, supra note 7 (discussing robotics and dangerous police operations).
122 Cf Graham supra note 8 (discussing deployment of Air Wing Unit during searches in
aftennath of 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing). The existing capabilities of the Massachusetts
State Police helicopters were highlighted during the Boston Marathon bombing manhunt. See id.
Using real-time aerial, infrared images, the police helicopter was able to aid in the capture of the
suspect without further violence. See Annear, supra note 6.
123 See Villarreal, supra note 7 (reporting on use of robotics in detecting suspects during
manhunt following 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing).
124 See id.
125 See S.1664, 188th Gen Ct. (Mass. 2013), available at
https://malegislature.gov/Bills/188/Senate/S1664 (proposing comprehensive regulatory scheme
for drone activity by law enforcement).
126 See S.1664; see also Bohm, supra note 95.

140

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XX

sensibly prohibits any weaponization of unmanned aircraft operating in the
Commonwealth's airspace and requires any UAV operation be in
compliance with existing and future FAA safeguards. 127 Additionally, this
proposed legislation prevents law enforcement from flying a drone unless a
lawful warrant is obtained or an emergency situation exists. 128
Administratively, the Massachusetts drone bill requires approval from
either a city council or the Secretary of Public Safety and outlines
legislative oversight into UAV operations. 29
Finally, the drafted
legislation helps limit widespread data collection and the types of
technology exploited through drone operation. 30
While the proposed drone privacy bill restricts dragnet police drone
surveillance broadly, it fails to effectively provide a complete statutory
framework for the future integration of drones into the Commonwealth's
skies.' 3'
First, the warrant requirement is woefully insufficient in
addressing drone technology as a police evidence-gathering tool. 13 2 Instead
of simply allowing drone surveillance in a criminal investigation through a
standard search warrant process, the law should provide stronger judicial
oversight similar to that of the so-called Massachusetts Wiretap Statute.' 33
Similar to the Massachusetts Wiretap Statute, drone surveillance should be
permitted only with written request from State Attorney General or a
District Attorney and where "normal investigative procedures have been
tried and have failed or reasonably appear unlikely to succeed if tried. 'i 14
A Court must find sufficient facts from the warrant application that amount
to probable cause. 135 Additionally, the bill should express evidentiary and
discovery safeguards when UAV evidence is being offered against a
criminal defendant such as the opportunity to suppress the UAV evidence if
it was obtained unconstitutionally or in nonconformity to the statutory
requirements. 136
Secondly, the proposed bill's emergency exception language
See S.1664.
See id.
129 See id.
130 See id.
131 See id.
132 Compare 1 LAFAVE, supra note 36 (discussing rationale of warrant requirement), with
127
128

THOMPSON, supra note 70, at 21 ("[T]he sheer sophistication of drone technology and the sensors
they can carry may remove drones from this traditional Fourth Amendment framework.").
133 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99 (2012) (governing "[i]nterception of wire and oral
communications").
134 See id.
135 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 2 (2012) (regulating search warrants in traditional
criminal investigations); supra notes 35-40 (discussing warrants).
136 See § 99.
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should be amended to reflect a clear reasonable suspicion standard and be
37
based on either the risk or threat of harm to an individual or the public. 1
Third, the drafted legislation only restricts law enforcement drones and
fails to regulate the future operation of UAVs by commercial entities and
private citizens in Massachusetts. 38 The state legislature should outright
ban UAV operation by both commercial entities and private entities unless
approval with temporal and functional limitations is granted by a requisite
state agency. 3 9 Furthermore, unlawful drone operation in Massachusetts
should trigger civil and potentially criminal sanctions against a rogue
operator. 40 More severe, unlawful drone operation such as the intentional
surveillance of other citizens or companies ought to trigger criminal
penalties consistent with current "peeping Tom" or stalking state
statutes.' 4' Finally, the proposed bill must express a more complete and
clear framework for administrative state agencies to research, develop,
42
review, and approve the operation of UAVs in the Commonwealth.
Rather than merely allowing drone operation after approval of a local
deliberative body or the Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety
and Security, the law should require both local and state approval. 143 These
improvements would allow for a more comprehensive regulation of drones
in Massachusetts and competently mitigate potential privacy and civil
liberty infringements.
D. Confronting UA V Evidence in CriminalProceedings
As the emerging technology of UAVs become investigative tools,
evidentiary issues arise for criminal law practitioners. 45 Where UAV
evidence is obtained in a criminal investigation, the defendant's exclusive
remedy is a motion to suppress. 146 For criminal attorneys in the
137

See

Cf

S.1664,

188th

Gen

Ct.

(Mass.

2013),

available

at

https://malegislature.gov/Bills/188/Senate/S 1664.
138 See id.
139

See Villasenor, supra note 14, at 512 (discussing interaction between privacy logistics

and fourth amendment jurisprudence).
140 See id at 500 (calling for reasonable monetary fine as penalty for unlawful UAV
operations).
141 See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 272, § 105 (2012) (Massachusetts "peeping tom" law); MASS.
GEN. LAWS. ch. 265, § 43 (2012) (Massachusetts stalking law).
142
143
144
145

See
See
See
See

S.1664.

id.
Villasenor supra note 14, at 473 (discussing mandate of comprehensive plans).
generally JOSEPH A. GRASSO & CHRISTINE McEvoy, SUPPRESSION MATTERS

UNDER MASSACHUSETTS LAW (2014).
146 See ALISON BLOOMQUIST, MASSACHUSETTS SUPERIOR COURT CRIMINAL PRACTICE
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Commonwealth, a prudent practitioner must cite both the U.S. Constitution
and the Massachusetts Constitution's Declaration of Rights because the
latter is "generally more "defendant friendly" than the U.S.
Constitution." 147 To succeed with an argument that evidence derived from
drone surveillance in a criminal investigation is inadmissible, the defendant
must argue that no reasonable exigent circumstances existed at the time of
the search. 148 Specifically, a defense attorney may counter the state's
attempts of introducing drone evidence by asserting that the operation of
the UAV was non-compliant with the relevant statute .149 When drone
surveillance becomes a criminal investigative tool, it is very likely that law
enforcement will be authorized by a search or arrest warrant. 5 °
Consequently, a defendant must show that despite previous judicial
approval, the warrant lacked probable cause.151
Conversely, if law
enforcement UAV use is governed by similar procedural and statutory
requirements of the Massachusetts Electronic Surveillance statute, criminal
attorneys may be afforded a multitude of statutory grounds to challenge the
search warrant of enhanced surveillance. 52
From the prosecution perspective, the availability of widespread
UAVs in criminal investigations is far from becoming the norm in the near
future.' 53 There can be no reasonable argument supporting widespread
drone evidence gathering in routine criminal investigations. 114 In sum, the
use of UAVs in criminal investigations should only be utilized where law
enforcement has no alternative means of gathering evidence upon an
organized, criminal enterprise, and where the surveillance is reasonably
likely to result in evidence of criminal activity."'
V. CONCLUSION
While law enforcement drones need to be strictly restrained by
MANUAL

§ 7.7.1 (2014) (summarizing practical components of litigating motion to suppress in

Massachusetts state courts).
147
148
149
150

See
See
See
See

id.
Part II.D (discussing exigent circumstances).
BLOOMQUIST, supra note 146 (outlining motions to suppress evidence).
Bohm, supra note 95 (describing multitude of state bills with warrant requirement for

UAV use); see also S. 1664 (calling for warrants when using drone surveillance during criminal
investigations.
151 See BLOOMQUIST, supra note 146 (discussing grounds for suppression).
152 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99 (2012) (delineating grounds for suppression of

evidence gathered through electronic surveillance).

See Black, supra note 71, at 1846-47; see also Villasenor, supra note 14, at 457.
See Rosen_ supra note 24.
155 See id.
153
154
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statute, the courts, and government agencies, this emerging technology
need not be universally condemned as the advent of George Orwell's
dystopian world.
American legislatures and courts should legally
discourage all dragnet surveillance conducted with drones. If sensible
legislation, along with strict judicial review, can be established, domestic
drones should be integrated into American skies. The courts must evolve
and confront the rapid pace of technology with more stringent approaches
to protecting privacy rights. On the practical side, civil libertarians should
not unconditionally reject law enforcement's operation of drones if used in
the same manner as existing police technology. The arrival of domestic
drones offers a new battle within the dichotomy of privacy and security
interests. Just as drones may benefit domestic security interests, they
burden the right of privacy. As drone and other technologies further
complicate this legal clash of competing interests, it will be up to
lawmakers and judges to offer reasonable and balanced solutions. While
drones possess benefits to public safety, the failure to adapt our Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence to the digital
age will create a digital albatross
156
upon the privacy interests of us all.
Gregory J Galizio

156

See Coleridge, supra note 1.

